An update for compat-openssl11 is now available for HCE 3.0 Security Advisory hws_security@huawei.com Huawei Cloud HCE3-SA-2025-0015 Final 1.0 1.0 2025-10-09T06:38:11:00Z current version 2025-10-09T06:38:11:00Z 2025-10-09T06:38:11:00Z HCE SA Engine 1.0.0 An update for compat-openssl11 is now available for HCE 3.0 HCE Security has rated this update as having a security impact of Critical.A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score, which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section. Security Fix(es): Issue summary: Use of the low-level GF(2^m) elliptic curve APIs with untrusted explicit values for the field polynomial can lead to out-of-bounds memory reads or writes. Impact summary: Out of bound memory writes can lead to an application crash or even a possibility of a remote code execution, however, in all the protocols involving Elliptic Curve Cryptography that we_x27;re aware of, either only "named curves" are supported, or, if explicit curve parameters are supported, they specify an X9.62 encoding of binary (GF(2^m)) curves that can_x27;t represent problematic input values. Thus the likelihood of existence of a vulnerable application is low. In particular, the X9.62 encoding is used for ECC keys in X.509 certificates, so problematic inputs cannot occur in the context of processing X.509 certificates. Any problematic use-cases would have to be using an "exotic" curve encoding. The affected APIs include: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(), EC_GROUP_new_from_params(), and various supporting BN_GF2m_*() functions. Applications working with "exotic" explicit binary (GF(2^m)) curve parameters, that make it possible to represent invalid field polynomials with a zero constant term, via the above or similar APIs, may terminate abruptly as a result of reading or writing outside of array bounds. Remote code execution cannot easily be ruled out. The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. (CVE-2024-9143) ** RESERVED ** This candidate has been reserved by an organization or individual that will use it when announcing a new security problem. When the candidate has been publicized, the details for this candidate will be provided. (CVE-2024-4741) Issue summary: Calling the OpenSSL API function SSL_select_next_proto with an empty supported client protocols buffer may cause a crash or memory contents to be sent to the peer. Impact summary: A buffer overread can have a range of potential consequences such as unexpected application beahviour or a crash. In particular this issue could result in up to 255 bytes of arbitrary private data from memory being sent to the peer leading to a loss of confidentiality. However, only applications that directly call the SSL_select_next_proto function with a 0 length list of supported client protocols are affected by this issue. This would normally never be a valid scenario and is typically not under attacker control but may occur by accident in the case of a configuration or programming error in the calling application. The OpenSSL API function SSL_select_next_proto is typically used by TLS applications that support ALPN (Application Layer Protocol Negotiation) or NPN (Next Protocol Negotiation). NPN is older, was never standardised and is deprecated in favour of ALPN. We believe that ALPN is significantly more widely deployed than NPN. The SSL_select_next_proto function accepts a list of protocols from the server and a list of protocols from the client and returns the first protocol that appears in the server list that also appears in the client list. In the case of no overlap between the two lists it returns the first item in the client list. In either case it will signal whether an overlap between the two lists was found. In the case where SSL_select_next_proto is called with a zero length client list it fails to notice this condition and returns the memory immediately following the client list pointer (and reports that there was no overlap in the lists). This function is typically called from a server side application callback for ALPN or a client side application callback for NPN. In the case of ALPN the list of protocols supplied by the client is guaranteed by libssl to never be zero in length. The list of server protocols comes from the application and should never normally be expected to be of zero length. In this case if the SSL_select_next_proto function has been called as expected (with the list supplied by the client passed in the client/client_len parameters), then the application will not be vulnerable to this issue. If the application has accidentally been configured with a zero length server list, and has accidentally passed that zero length server list in the client/client_len parameters, and has additionally failed to correctly handle a "no overlap" response (which would normally result in a handshake failure in ALPN) then it will be vulnerable to this problem. In the case of NPN, the protocol permits the client to opportunistically select a protocol when there is no overlap. OpenSSL returns the first client protocol in the no overlap case in support of this. The list of client protocols comes from the application and should never normally be expected to be of zero length. However if the SSL_select_next_proto function is accidentally called with a client_len of 0 then an invalid memory pointer will be returned instead. If the application uses this output as the opportunistic protocol then the loss of confidentiality will occur. This issue has been assessed as Low severity because applications are most likely to be vulnerable if they are using NPN instead of ALPN - but NPN is not widely used. It also requires an application configuration or programming error. Finally, this issue would not typically be under attacker control making active exploitation unlikely. The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing new releases of OpenSSL at this time. The fix will be included in the next releases when they become available. (CVE-2024-5535) Issue summary: A timing side-channel which could potentially allow recovering the private key exists in the ECDSA signature computation. Impact summary: A timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computations could allow recovering the private key by an attacker. However, measuring the timing would require either local access to the signing application or a very fast network connection with low latency. There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word of the inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significant probability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particular the NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the attacker process must either be located in the same physical computer or must have a very fast network connection with low latency. For that reason the severity of this vulnerability is Low. (CVE-2024-13176) This document is provided on an "AS IS" basis and does not implyany kind of guarantee or warranty, either express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. 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Huawei Cloud EulerOS 3.0 compat-openssl11 This vulnerability can be exploited only when the following conditions are present: None Vulnerability details: For technical details, customers are advised to reference the website: https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-9143 CVE-2024-9143 HCE 3.0:compat-openssl11-1.1.1m-13.hce3 For technical details, customers are advised to referencethe website: https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-9143 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N This vulnerability can be exploited only when the following conditions are present: None Vulnerability details: For technical details, customers are advised to reference the website: https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-4741 CVE-2024-4741 HCE 3.0:compat-openssl11-1.1.1m-13.hce3 For technical details, customers are advised to referencethe website: https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-4741 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H This vulnerability can be exploited only when the following conditions are present: None Vulnerability details: For technical details, customers are advised to reference the website: https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-5535 CVE-2024-5535 HCE 3.0:compat-openssl11-1.1.1m-13.hce3 For technical details, customers are advised to referencethe website: https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-5535 9.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H This vulnerability can be exploited only when the following conditions are present: None Vulnerability details: For technical details, customers are advised to reference the website: https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-13176 CVE-2024-13176 HCE 3.0:compat-openssl11-1.1.1m-13.hce3 For technical details, customers are advised to referencethe website: https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-13176 4.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L