HCE2-SA-2025-0322 Moderate HCE 2.0 Security Fix(es): A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE. For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection. (CVE-2022-4304) HCE 2.0 shim-15.4-2.r26.hce2.x86_64.rpm shim-15.4-2.r26.hce2.aarch64.rpm shim-aa64-storage-15.4-2.r26.hce2.aarch64.rpm